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All the World’s a Platform?: Some Remarks on “Marketplace Platform”
Employment Laws
By Michael C. Duff1
I.

Introduction

This paper addresses the enactment of marketplace platform laws, which have arisen as a
remarkable feature of the gig economy2 in recent years. A marketplace platform law decides the
question of whether an individual worker is an independent contractor or an employee—an
ongoing controversy in all employment law, including workers’ compensation law—by
emphasizing factors other than those normally considered in traditional legal analyses.3 As of this
writing, seven states appear to have enacted marketplace platform laws.4 Before focusing on one
such marketplace platform law, some context on any gig law discussion may be helpful.
Legal academics have noted that there are essentially two dominant currents of theoretical
perspective on the gig economy writ large: it is seen either as an utter canard explained by the
desire to evade existing law, or as an evolution of the very nature of work.5 It has been suggested
that one way to break through this conceptual bifurcation may be to “effectively distinguish app
employees from bona fide independent contractors . . . [by] ask[ing] the same question that initially
sparked the independent contractor designation: Do today’s ‘independent contractors’ possess
sufficient skill and economic autonomy to stand alone in the marketplace?”6 The problem with
this perspective is that it is not at all clear that the original establishment of the independent
contractor classification had anything much to do with imposing liability on those likely to be able
to compensate injury victims. Rather, creation of the independent contractor category may simply
have been a strategy allowing masters to escape tort liability created by putative servants. In other
words, creating a category of “not servants” may have had more to do with a “push” policy of tortliability-avoidance than a “pull” policy of consciously-allocative tort compensation (leaving
entirely to one side questions of employment law—including workers’ compensation—coverage).
The distinction between a servant or employee and an independent contractor has
been said to lie in the fact that the latter does the work on his own time, in his own
way, and under no one’s directions but his own, so that the one who selected the
contractor has no control or right of control over the manner in which it is done. It
is therefore to be regarded as the contractor’s own enterprise, and he, rather than
the one who retained his services, is the proper party to be charged with the risk.
Also, no doubt, there is in the picture, although not often expressed, the fact that,
taken as a class, independent contractors are in the main financially responsible
parties, at least to a far greater extent than employees.7 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the foundation for the original independent contractor category was probably that the
“master” ought not to be held accountable for circumstances over which he or she had no control,
for reasons of fairness, and it was occasionally a happy fortuity that some entities deemed to be
independent contractors turned out to be “financially responsible parties” (at least in comparison
to penniless “employees”), though one may very much doubt that it was the primary reason behind

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3520723

the employee-independent contractor bifurcation.8 Moreover, the whole idea of vicarious liability
(respondeat superior) was “bitterly” contested by common law judges throughout the 19th century.9
The earliest English precedents fail to cite authority for the proposition that vicarious liability
existed; and no less a luminary than Oliver Wendell Holmes thought the common law version was
a fiction derived from Roman law: if my servant (a chattel) harmed you, you had the right to kill
or maim my servant.10 To avoid this result, I could pay you compensation. Over time, some links
in the chain were lost, and it became the rule that I could simply approach you (the master) for
compensation for the wrongs done by your servant, though you were in no sense at fault.11 There
seems no getting around the fact that respondeat superior was (and is) a form of strict liability, and
that without the respondeat superior doctrine there would be no disputes over “independent
contractors” in tort cases because masters would have no need to escape liability for the torts of
their servants.
So much for a clean tort theory on the origins of the independent contractor doctrine being
grounded somehow in the liability-worthiness of contractors. And if respondeat superior was a
mere public policy expedient—the brute ability to recover from deep pockets—small wonder that
disputes over whether a worker is truly a “servant” have been ongoing since the mid-nineteenth
century. If you are going to arbitrarily fleece me under respondeat superior, regardless your good
social intentions, I am going to resist. Nineteenth-century judges seemed extremely reluctant to
hold the users of “workers” liable in all cases, and the instinct to prevent the perceived injustice of
such strict liability seemed strong.12 Still, respondeat superior “won out,” and there is probably
more than one economic explanation for why it did. Perhaps an explanation hitting closer to the
mark than the placement of liability on parties that could pay simply because they could pay
(employees, no liability because unable to pay; independent contractors, liability, because able to
pay), is that of the “cheapest cost avoider.” Liability might simply be placed on the party having
control of the risks inherent in activity because that party could take precautions against those
risks. This idea provides a plausible explanation of why workers’ compensation (and other
employment) law has remained firmly connected to common law principles to notions of control—
the entity that controls workplace conditions may take precautions against various forms of “antisocial” conduct. It is also a public policy seeming to marry ideas of justice, general deterrence, and
instrumental realism.13
II.

“Classical” Workers’ Compensation

Whatever the economic justifications for creation of independent contractor doctrine in the
nineteenth century, and despite nineteenth-century judicial resistance to concepts of respondeat
superior in tort contexts, the first English workers’ compensation statute (of 1897)—which was
the prototype for early American workers’ compensation statutes—made no bones about
significantly interfering with attempts by employers to unilaterally designate workers as
independent contractors:
Where, in an employment to which this Act applies, the undertakers as herein-after
defined contract with any person for the execution by or under such contractor of
any work, and the undertakers would, if such work were executed by workmen
immediately employed by them, be liable to pay compensation under this Act to
those workmen in respect of any accident arising out of and in the course of their
2
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employment, the undertakers shall be liable to pay to any workman employed in
the execution of the work any compensation which is payable to the workman
(whether under this Act or in respect of personal negligence or wilful act
independently of this Act) by such contractor, or would be so payable if such
contractor were an employer to whom this Act applies.
Provided that the undertakers shall be entitled to be indemnified by any other person
who would have been liable independently of this section.
This section shall not apply to any contract with any person for the execution by or
under such contractor of any work which is merely ancillary or incidental to, and is
no part of, or process in, the trade or business carried on by such undertakers
respectively.14
Readers may recognize this language as a foundational form of “statutory employment.”15
If an “undertaker” employed contractors to do work that was not merely “ancillary or incidental”
to, and was a part of, or process in, the trade or business carried on by the undertaker, the
contractors were covered “workmen” under the act. It is on this “part of, or process in” question
that market contractor laws seem to depart significantly from workers’ compensation theory.
III.

Platform Laws Meet the 1897 Test

In 2018, a number of states passed “market contractor” laws under the apparent lobbying
impetus of the company, Handy, Inc.16 As will be shown, these laws unquestionably make it
significantly easier for companies to classify their workers as independent contractors rather than
employees, thereby lowering their operating costs, but also creating a class of individuals with
fewer legal protections when suffering on-the-job injuries.17 Although styled as laws applicable
only to retired handymen, and similar part-time workers, the text of the laws is much broader than
this innocuous characterization suggests.18 Simply put, they do not, by their terms, apply only to
handymen (or similar categories of workers), nor do they apply only to part-time workers. But
even the innocuous characterization of the laws might give one pause. In what sense are laws
applicable to handymen touching on a revolutionary new economy (the apparent premise for why
gig laws are justifiable in the first place)? These are very broad laws with no obvious, narrower
connection to the “mysterious” world of high-tech coders, and the like, whose work, we are told,
defies analysis under traditional restatement factors. What makes the employment seem “gig-like”
to legislators appears to be that workers are dispatched to their work with an app, or even just
through a computer. Almost identical laws were passed in in Arizona (2017),19 Florida,20 Indiana,21
Iowa,22 Kentucky,23 Tennessee,24 and Utah (2018)25—not all of these are locations that might
evoke images of a booming, high-tech economy.26 Handy-laws were defeated in Alabama,
California, Colorado, and Georgia.27 This paper aims to briefly show how expansive these
marketplace platform laws are by focusing closely on statutory language. The laws impact
workers’ compensation significantly because each of them carries the talismanic phrase that the
law applies “for all purposes under state and local laws, rules, ordinances, and resolutions . . .”28
The advocacy group National Domestic Workers’ Alliance argued, in connection with enactment
of a Handy law in Tennessee:

3
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The [Chattanooga] Times Free Press reported that sponsor Senator Watson likened
“the marketplace platforms to business advertising in newspapers.” We invite
Senator Watson to talk to a Handy worker, who will explain that marketplace
platforms set the rates of workers, charge workers fines for changing their work
schedule, facilitate payments and change rates of workers according to reviews.
Not much like a newspaper when you think about it, is it?29
Thus, the argument centers on a debate as to whether a “marketplace platform” is no more than a
passive information clearinghouse merely offering “disinterested” space for contractors and third
parties to enter into contractual relationships without the platform having any input into what
happens thereafter.30 In other words, are marketplace platforms “undertakers” (to use the language
from classical workers’ compensation) contracting “with any person for the execution by or under
such contractor of any work, and the undertakers would, if such work were executed by workmen
immediately employed by them . . .” or is the work of contractors “merely ancillary or incidental
to, and is no part of, or process in, the trade or business carried on by such undertakers . . .”
IV.

Analysis of a Handy/Contractor Law—Tennessee

Because the platform laws under discussion are nearly identical, analysis of just one of
them, Tennessee’s, will suit the purposes of this short paper:
Under the selected law,31 a “marketplace contractor” working for a “third party” at the
direction of a “marketplace platform” is an independent contractor as a matter of law if:
(1) the platform and contractor agree in writing that the contractor is an independent
contractor with respect to the market platform;
(2) the platform does not unilaterally prescribe specific hours of work. If a marketplace
contractor posts the contractor's voluntary availability to provide services, the posting does not
constitute a prescription of hours;
(3) the platform does not prohibit the contractor from using any online-enabled
application, software, website, or system offered by other marketplace platforms;
(4) The marketplace contractor may, at its discretion, enlist the help of an assistant to
complete the services, and the marketplace platform may require the assistant to complete the
marketplace platform's standard registration and vetting process. If the marketplace contractor
enlists the help of an assistant, the marketplace contractor, not the marketplace platform, is
responsible for paying the assistant;
(5) The marketplace platform does not restrict the marketplace contractor from
engaging in any other occupation or business;
(6) The marketplace platform does not require marketplace contractors to use specific
supplies or equipment;

4
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(7) The marketplace platform does not control the means and methods for the services
performed by a marketplace contractor by requiring the marketplace contractor to follow
specified instructions governing how to perform the services. However, the marketplace platform
may require that the quality of the services provided by the marketplace contractor meets
specific standards and requirements;
(8) The agreement or contract between the marketplace contractor and the marketplace
platform may be terminated by either the marketplace contractor or the marketplace platform
with or without cause;
(9) The marketplace platform provides no medical or other insurance benefits to the
marketplace contractor, and the marketplace contractor is responsible for paying taxes on all
income derived as a result of services performed to third parties from the assignments or
connections received from the marketplace platform; and
(10) All, or substantially all, payment to the marketplace contractor is based on
performance of services to third parties who have engaged the services of the marketplace
contractor through the marketplace platform.
Before setting out more of the law, it may be worth remarking here that factor seven (the
statute, like the Restatement Second of Agency, utilizes ten factors)—control—would be
extremely important in many employee-versus-independent contractor analyses. Indeed, under the
ABC test that is at the heart of the AB 5/Dynamex rule in California,32 the burden would be on the
putative employer to establish its absence of control, Under the Tennessee law, however, the
control factor is merely one of ten, and the other nine seem designed to be very easy for a “market
platform” to satisfy. For example, rather than determining whether a putative independent
contractor in fact engages in another business or calling—as would be the question in a
Restatement analysis,33 it is enough for the platform not to have restricted the worker from doing
so. Similarly, the question under the Handy laws is whether the platform requires the contractor
to use specific supplies or equipment or prevents the contractor from seeking other employment,
not whether the contractor actually does so.34 Thus, in addition to providing a simplified factor test
weighted in favor of finding an independent contractor status, the law also seems designed to
disregard consideration of the economic realities surrounding the relationship between the
contractors and the platform.
Continuing with exposition of the law, a “marketplace contractor” means35 any individual,
corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship, or other business entity that:
•

•

Enters into an agreement with a marketplace platform to use the platform’s onlineenabled application, software, website, or system to be given an assignment, or otherwise
receive connections, to third-party individuals or entities seeking its services in this state;
and
In return for compensation from the third-party or marketplace platform, offers or
provides services to third-party individuals or entities upon being given an assignment
or connection through the marketplace platform's online-enabled application, software,
website, or system.
5
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A “marketplace platform,” in turn36 “means a corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship,
or other business entity operating in this state that offers an online-enabled application, software,
website, or system that enables the provision of services by marketplace contractors to thirdparty individuals or entities seeking the services.” Under this definition it is difficult to conceive
any company that could not characterize itself as a marketplace platform. Companies use “onlineenabled” websites, after all. Customers may be recast as “third-parties.” When the customer
contacts the company he or she is “seeking services” from service-provider-employees, now recast
as “marketplace contractors” who, after all, “agreed” in advance and in writing that they were
contractors. (Something that students of the history of workers’ compensation may recognize as a
thinly-disguised pre-injury waiver of liability).
Imagine a situation in which a contractor is subject to discipline if he or she does not
comply with a work schedule “voluntarily” posted by the platform; imagine a contractor who does
not in fact use other “platforms” but has used the same “platform” exclusively for a period of years;
imagine a contractor who does not in fact engage in any other occupation or business than his or
work through the platform (and never has); imagine a contractor who in fact uses platformprovided supplies or equipment (and always has); and imagine a platform that in fact supplies
supervision to the contractor. None of this may matter for purposes of the independent contractor
analysis if the worker has “agreed in writing” that he or she is not an employee, and if a company
offers an “online-enabled application.” Thus, if one calls the plumbing company this year (just as
one called the plumbing company last year), the company might announce that it is not a plumbing
company, after all, and that you are not a “customer” but rather a “third-party.” The plumbing
company has reimagined itself as a technology company because it possesses a website and
dispatches to jobs its now-contractor-plumbers through use of a Google app and a couple of
handfuls of Tracfones. If the benefit gained through such a metamorphosis is a complete release
of the company from the obligation to comply with a state’s labor and employment laws, none of
this is at all difficult to imagine.
V.

Conclusion

It is a simple axiom of workers’ compensation policy that an industry must pay for the
costs of its injuries. One can pretend that Handy is not in the industry of handymen or Uber is not
in the industry of transportation. In a sense this is true in the way it is also true that no business is
permanently tethered to its business. Apple (an actual technology company) happens to be in the
business of providing technology because it is profitable. If it were not profitable, Apple would
exit the business and invest its capital elsewhere. But while it is in the technology business, it is in
technology business. Handy Inc. may only temporarily happen to be in the industry of providing
handymen, but while it is providing Handymen, it is engaged in the industry of handymen. It seems
very bad policy to exempt companies within an industry from sharing the burden of the costs of
injuries to its “workers” without fully exploring the relationship between the platform and those
workers.
It has always been fundamental to workers’ compensation that workers engaged in the
process of a venturer’s business may be treated as employees if the business would otherwise have
used “employees” to carry on its core activities (the “B” factor in the ABC test). In the language
of the “old” workers’ compensation law, workers should be covered if they are part of the trade or
business carried on by the “undertakers” of productive activity. A society might come to a different
6
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conclusion about how to allocate the costs of injury (or how to disseminate other social polices
embedded in employment statutes) than to cover “employees” by industry sectors. But changing
the rules for coverage—or effectively discontinuing coverage altogether—should be carefully
discussed and deliberated upon by the broader society. Regrettably, platform workers, including
handymen, will be injured in the course of work. Who will pay for the costs of injury, and how
much will be paid? These questions have historically been decided transparently by the body
politic; and experience counsels the use of democratic process before embarking on a public policy
adventure.
Market platform laws also aggravate the growing disuniformity in “employment status”
determinations throughout the United States. To the ABC and Restatement tests is now added the
seven-state marketplace platform test. One may recall that a central justification for enactment of
the federal employment benefit statute, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA), was to relieve employers from the burdens of having to comply with different benefit
structures throughout the country. “Requiring ERISA administrators to master the relevant laws
of 50 States and to contend with litigation would undermine the congressional goal of
‘minimiz[ing] the administrative and financial burden[s]’ on plan administrators—burdens
ultimately borne by the beneficiaries.”37 Even within states employee definitions can differ
between employment statutes.38 Now it appears we may have national “zones” in which employee
determinations may significantly (or even completely) differ: ABC, Restatement/Common law,
marketplace platforms.39 In the din arising from this disuniformity, the policy of adequate
compensation for workplace injury often seems lost.
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